These limits Grutter explained were intended
Posted: Sun Apr 06, 2025 8:50 am
Thus, special and concrete measures to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups can be taken by States Parties to ICERD for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, so long as these measures do not maintain any further unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. If the objectives of race-conscious admissions programs is to ensure student body diversity as the means to realize the right to education, enable persons to participate effectively, strengthen human rights and fundamental freedoms as part of the international human right to education, it could be reasonably argued (within the purview of international human rights law) that special and concrete measures that result in separate rights for different racial groups could terminate only after such objectives have been achieved. Admittedly, however, ascertaining whether such objectives have indeed been achieved will be both a qualitative and special lead quantitative exercise, not easily susceptible to the “measurability” that the SCOTUS decision emphasized to survive the strict scrutiny test under the Equal Protection Clause.
Meaningful or Logical “End Point” as Grutter v. Bollinger Required
Because SCOTUS has never agreed to consider race-conscious admissions programs as part of “remedying societal discrimination”, but only an extraordinary exception to a “colour-blind constitution”, Grutter v. Bollinger endorsed Justice Powell’s view in Bakke that student body diversity is a compelling state interest for which race-conscious admissions programs would survive strict scrutiny. However, SCOTUS imposed limits in Grutter: “The school could not “establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.” Id., at 334. Neither could it “insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission.” Ibid. Nor still could it desire “some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.” Id., at 329–330 (quoting Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.)). to guard against two dangers that all race-based government action portends. The first is the risk that the use of race will devolve into “illegitimate .
Meaningful or Logical “End Point” as Grutter v. Bollinger Required
Because SCOTUS has never agreed to consider race-conscious admissions programs as part of “remedying societal discrimination”, but only an extraordinary exception to a “colour-blind constitution”, Grutter v. Bollinger endorsed Justice Powell’s view in Bakke that student body diversity is a compelling state interest for which race-conscious admissions programs would survive strict scrutiny. However, SCOTUS imposed limits in Grutter: “The school could not “establish quotas for members of certain racial groups or put members of those groups on separate admissions tracks.” Id., at 334. Neither could it “insulate applicants who belong to certain racial or ethnic groups from the competition for admission.” Ibid. Nor still could it desire “some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin.” Id., at 329–330 (quoting Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.)). to guard against two dangers that all race-based government action portends. The first is the risk that the use of race will devolve into “illegitimate .